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Abstract2 
Much of the discussion around the port development in Prince Rupert has 
focused on the positive impacts that the container port will have on the 
regional economy. As the opening quote suggests, the port is being 
hailed a piece of “transformational infrastructure”, creating numerous 
opportunities for economic diversification in northern British Columbia.  In 
this sense, therefore, it is widely expected that the container port will help 
to move the northern economy beyond the type of traditional resource 
dependency outlined by scholars such as Harold Innis (Drache, 1995).  
This article argues, however, that there are at least two other potential 
outcomes or scenarios concerning the port’s development and its impact 
on northern British Columbia which call into question some of the 
assumptions made by the port’s proponents. First, the port might be a 
great success as a gateway to a transportation corridor that stretches 
across western Canada and into the United States, but have little or no 
positive impact on the northern British Columbia economy.  Second, the 
port might not live up to the expectations that have been set nationally or 
locally neither as a transportation gateway nor as a piece of 
transformational infrastructure 
 
“The port has been described not only as transportation infrastructure, but 
as ‘transformational infrastructure’ because it’s going to transform 
northern BC’s economy.” (Vancouver Sun, January 14, 2005). 
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Introduction1 
The construction of a deep-water container port in Prince Rupert is one of the most 
important developments to occur in northern British Columbia in recent memory.    The 
port, which is the result of collaboration between the public and private sectors, will 
strengthen British Columbia’s and Canada’s trading links with the expanding markets of 
Asia and the Pacific Rim.  It could also provide a welcome boost to the economy of 
northern British Columbia and, in particular, to the City of Prince Rupert and the 
communities along the Highway 16 corridor.  In the past two decades, this region has 
been negatively impacted by the “boom and bust” cycles common in resource producing 
economies; in particular, the softwood lumber dispute with the United States, the 
mountain pine beetle epidemic, and the declining demand for lumber products in the 
United States housing market.  The Prince Rupert port development is even seen as 
having positive economic impacts outside British Columbia.  As a key part of the Pacific 
Gateway Strategy, a government-sponsored effort to enhance Canada’s ability to 
respond to trading opportunities in Asia, the new container port could benefit Canadians 
across the country. 
Much of the discussion around the port development has focused on the positive 
impacts that the container port will have on the regional economy. As the opening quote 
suggests, the port is being hailed a piece of “transformational infrastructure”, creating 
numerous opportunities for economic diversification in northern British Columbia.  In this 
sense, therefore, it is widely expected that the container port will help to move the 
northern economy beyond the type of traditional resource dependency outlined by 
scholars such as Harold Innis (Drache, 1995).  We will argue, however, that there are at 
least two other potential outcomes or scenarios concerning the port’s development and 
its impact on northern British Columbia which call into question some of the assumptions 
made by the port’s proponents. First, the port might be a great success as a gateway to 
a transportation corridor that stretches across western Canada and into the United 
States, but have little or no positive impact on the northern British Columbia economy.  
Second, the port might not live up to the expectations that have been set nationally or 
locally neither as a transportation gateway nor as a piece of transformational 
infrastructure  
In both of these scenarios, the economic dependencies which currently exist in which 
northern British Columbia would be perpetuated or even exacerbated.  Even in the event 
that the port is a huge success, in terms of diversifying the economy of northern British 
Columbia, the region will still be largely dependent on decisions made, and events taking 
place, outside the region over which it is little or no control.          
Outcome One: The Port of Prince Rupert as Transportation and 
Transformation 
Like many provincial northern economies, the economy of northern British Columbia 
has, for many decades, been dependent on the production of natural resources.  
Although the nature of this economic activity has changed over time (for example, large, 
centralized mills have replaced small, community-based mills), there has been very little 
deviation from the resource-based economy into other sectors.  One of the reasons for 
this is that the region lacks the economies of scale found in larger urban centers.  Other 
than Prince George (population 75,000), there are no large cities which could support a 
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robust manufacturing base or a market for manufactured products.  Even if such 
conditions existed, until recently, there has been no trade outlet for exporting 
manufactured products, other than the heavily congested port of Vancouver to the south 
and the rail and road transportation corridor to markets in the east.  
The creation of a deep-water container port in Prince Rupert has been hailed by many 
as an economic diversifier for northern British Columbia.  While it is probably more 
accurate to describe the new port as a potential facilitator of economic diversification, the 
idea is essentially the same.  The port has already generated new development and 
employment opportunities in transportation infrastructure.  The container port in Prince 
Rupert and the inland port facility in Prince George are just two examples. It will also 
provide a trade corridor to markets in Asia, thereby creating the conditions for the 
development of locally-based manufacturing and value-added industries.  Some of these 
industries will be connected to the existing resource-based economy, while others, it is 
hoped, will be new industries that will diversify the economic base of northern British 
Columbia.          
At first glance, this may seem like a very new development.  It is, however, a 
reenactment of the changes that were affecting Prince Rupert almost 100 years ago.  
The story of the Prince Rupert port began on a note of economic optimism in the first 
decade of the 20th century with the completion of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway 
(GTPR) and the establishment of the Prince Rupert as the coastal terminus for this 
transcontinental railway (Large, 1973, 1).  According to the vision of Charles M. Hays, 
the General Manager of the GTPR, the new town would have a population of 50,000 and 
“would rival Vancouver and steal its Oriental trade.” (Large, 1973, 39).  Hays wanted to 
import silk from Asia, via Prince Rupert, and ship it by rail to markets in eastern North 
America and Europe.  W. Hicks argues that, “popular perception insists that the loss of 
Hays [he died in the sinking of the Titanic in 1912] led to the downfall of the GTP [Grand 
Trunk Pacific] and, with it, Prince Rupert’s glowing future as a rival to Vancouver. 
However, it is doubtful that either Hays or [then Prime Minister Wilfred] Laurier could 
have rescued the GTP from bankruptcy or ensured the development of the northern port 
in competition to Vancouver or Seattle” (Hicks, 2003, 31).  
The story of Charles Hays and the early history of Prince Rupert have two striking 
modern parallels.  First, the current port development is primarily a reaction to a similar 
set of global economic circumstances: expanding trade opportunities with China and 
Asia.  Although Prince Rupert will provide a gateway for Canadian products including, 
most importantly, natural resources which will fuel the booming economies of Asia, the 
proposed container facility will thrive on imported items from Asia destined for markets in 
eastern and central United States.  Second, as will be explained below, the port 
development in Prince Rupert is viewed by some, as a potential rival to Vancouver’s 
ports and their trade with Asia.  Despite the fact that the current level of trade with Asia 
probably means that there will be more than enough container traffic to allow everyone 
to prosper, the Vancouver Port Authority has been critical of the federal government’s 
plans to use public money to fund the development of the Prince Rupert container port 
(Prince Rupert Daily News, January 20, 2005).         
In the years that followed its initial development, Prince Rupert experienced the peaks 
and troughs common in northern resource-dependent communities.  A slump in the 
1930s was succeeded by a boom during the Second World War when thousands of 
Canadian and American troops were stationed in the town to guard against possible 
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enemy attack and invasion.  The town also benefited from shipbuilding associated with 
the war effort (Large, 1973, 67).   
Throughout its history, the economy of Prince Rupert has been connected quite closely 
to the economy of northern British Columbia.  In the post-war period, the opening of a 
pulp mill in nearby Port Edward and the grain terminal, coupled with resource 
development in areas such as fishing, mining and other resource production sustained 
Prince Rupert.  Conversely, the decline of some of these resource industries in the 
1980s and 1990s, has impacted negatively on the city (Prince George Citizen, June 29, 
2005) 
In part, the container port development is the result of an upswing in the economy of 
western Canada.  Renewed resource development, caused by surging global resource 
prices, and an increase in timber production, caused primarily by the mountain pine 
beetle epidemic, have reinvigorated the economies of Alberta and British Columbia.  
Prince Rupert, in turn, is seen as an outlet to the world for many of these resource 
products.2  The main impetus behind the container port development, however, is the 
“tsunami” of trade with the booming Asian economies.  Congestion at existing Canadian 
and other west coast ports has even forced some shipping companies to make the long 
journey through the Panama Canal to ports on the east coast of North America (National 
Post, December 10, 2004).  It is increasingly apparent that: 
A fundamental shift is taking place in the global economy with Asia occupying an 
increasingly central role in world trade.  Unprecedented growth in Chinese export 
volumes and increasing demands for coal and iron ore imports, have made 
China an important growth engine for the world economy.  At present, China is 
Canada’s second largest trading partner and British Columbia’s largest off-shore 
trading partner, accounting for 60% of growth in world trade.  By 2020, China is 
forecast to be the world’s second largest economy and a key driver of Asia-
Pacific trade expansion, with plans to quadruple 2000 gross domestic product 
(GDP) levels and expand Chinese port throughput capacity above the 2.6 billion 
tones of cargo already handled annually (Pacific Gateway Strategy Action Plan, 
2006, 1) 
In a way, the two processes outlined above are connected.  The Chinese economy 
requires the resources produced in western Canada to sustain its growing export 
economy.  This economy, in turn, nourishes consumer markets in North America.  As a 
gateway to and from North America, Prince Rupert is in the somewhat unique position of 
benefiting from both of these broader economic trends. 
At the same time, changes in the container ship industry, such as the increased 
specialization of container ships and the growth in the size of these vessels is 
revolutionizing the industry (Ircha, 2001, 319).  The larger ships will require deep-water 
ports with specialized docking and unloading facilities (Ircha, 2001, 322).  As a deep-
water port with relatively good inter-modal (rail and road) connections, Prince Rupert is 
well-positioned to take advantage of these changes.  The port, which is located 500 
nautical miles north of Vancouver, is also the closest North American port to Asia (Ircha, 
2001, 326)3.  Prince Rupert has fairly good rail connections with significant excess 
capacity.  Moreover, the rail line linking Prince Rupert with Edmonton, on the eastern 
side of the Rocky Mountains, has a lower rail grade than the southern rail line through 
the Rocky Mountains between Vancouver and Calgary (Ircha, 2001, 326).              
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Economic and industry-related trends aside, it is also important to note the changes in 
the political context that helped prepare the way for the port development.  Perhaps the 
most significant change concerned the way ports are administered in Canada.  In 1998, 
the Canada Marine Act placed the major Canadian ports, including Prince Rupert, under 
the administrative jurisdiction of the autonomous Canada Port Authorities (Skinning the 
Cat, 2005, 1).  This provided the ports with less government direction and a greater 
degree of flexibility in terms of their commercial operations.  However, it also placed 
constraints on the port authorities by limiting their ability to borrow funds for maintenance 
or capital expansion and forbidding the use of public funds for these purposes (Skinning 
the Cat, 2005, 1).    
In the case of Prince Rupert, the federal government has managed to circumvent these 
restrictions by channeling funding through Western Economic Diversification Canada 
(Skinning the Cat, 2005, 1), a department which promotes “the development and 
diversification of the economy of Western Canada and [advances] the interests of the 
West in national economic policy.” (WEDC website, http://www.wd.gc.ca/wwd_e.asp).4  
As noted above, this policy has met with some opposition from the Vancouver Port 
Authority, which views the funding as an unfair government subsidy.  Support for the port 
development, however, is broad and not just centered on the federal government.  
Provincial governments, especially in British Columbia and Alberta, have been key 
proponents of the port, as have industry players such as Canadian National Rail (CN), 
and Canadian Pacific Rail (CP), Maher Terminals of Canada Corporation, and local 
organizations across northern British Columbia.5 
Many of these actors are involved in the Pacific Gateway Strategy (PGS), an initiative 
that seeks to secure Canada’s economic place within the Pacific Rim.  The PGS, along 
with the British Columbia Ports Strategy, have attempted to position Canada within this 
larger trading area by supporting the development of key infrastructure projects, such as 
the Prince Rupert and Vancouver ports and western Canadian airports (Pacific Gateway 
Strategy Action Plan, 2006, 3; British Columbia Ports Strategy, 2005).  Whereas the 
strategy is the product of consultations with key stakeholders in industry and 
government, it is also recognized that “[o]ngoing engagement and communication with 
municipalities, local associations, First Nations and interest groups will be essential.” 
(Pacific Gateway Strategic Action Plan, 2006, 4). 
Aside from promoting Canada’s ties to Asia through the PGS, the federal government’s 
position on the port development has been motivated by political considerations.  When 
the federal government finally announced that it would support the project, the Liberals 
were in power with a minority government and Prime Minister Paul Martin was facing the 
likely prospect of a tough election in the not so distant future.  Supporting the port 
development was one way of shoring up Liberal support in British Columbia (Skinning 
the Cat, 2005, 2).  Naked political ambitions aside, the federal government also 
recognized that:  
there may be considerable advantages in promoting the development of the two 
more remote sites of Prince Rupert and Canso [a deep-water port in Nova 
Scotia] as both are situated within economically depressed areas.  Developing 
major container terminals to serve all North America from Prince Rupert and 
Canso would stimulate economic development and generate new jobs in these 
areas of relatively high unemployment (Ircha, 2001, 328-329).          
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The literature on the port development, which consists largely of media reports, 
government documents and information brochures, paints a generally positive image of 
the proposed facility and its impact on Prince Rupert and northern British Columbia.  
Prince Rupert Container Terminal Development: Opening a New World of Opportunity, a 
publication of the Port of Prince Rupert, outlines three specific benefits that the port will 
bring to the city and the region: sustained socio-economic benefit; environmental 
enhancement; and support in the regional community.   According to this document, the 
port is expected to generate 1000 new jobs per year throughout the region.  Many of 
these jobs will be created in the local manufacturing industries that are expected to 
develop as a result of the port.  The document also states that “the activities engaged in 
by the Port to ensure the protection of the environment go above and beyond that 
necessary given what would normally be required for a project of this scope” (Prince 
Rupert Container Terminal Development).  Lastly, it points to the broad support that the 
project has in the community and throughout the region (Prince Rupert Container 
Terminal Development).   
One of the expectations for important spin-offs from the port development is the opening 
up of niche markets for entrepreneurs across the north. Container shipping provides an 
extraordinary advantage to exporters because they can ship smaller amounts of goods 
or combine their smaller shipments into a single container. This will allow individual 
entrepreneurs with specialized products, (foods, arts and crafts, log homes) to reach the 
Asian market. While this may seem a small drop in the economic bucket, it is important 
to remember that these activities can provide significant supplemental income to 
individuals living in more rural and remote parts of the province. 
If expectations are realized, the new port could also bring some tangible economic 
benefits to First Nations communities in the Prince Rupert region.  The region of Canada 
that is now northern British Columbia has been the homeland of numerous First Nations 
for thousands of years.  In the area around Prince Rupert, which is the traditional 
territory of the Tsimshian First Nation, there are a number of Aboriginal communities, 
including Lax Kw’Alaams and Metlakatla.  Additionally, many other Aboriginal people 
from the Tsimshian First Nation and other neighbouring First Nations live in the City of 
Prince Rupert.6   
As the port development has come to fruition, local First Nations have made it known 
that they wish to benefit from the ensuing economic activity.  In January 2006, the Lax 
Kw’Alaams and Metlakatla bands filed a court application challenging the port 
development.  The application stated that the proposed container terminal violated 
native land rights and requested that the whole project be put on hold until proper 
consultation could be held with the newly-elected Conservative government and 
Western Economic Diversification, the federal agency that has been involved in the 
project (Prince George Citizen, April 15, 2006).  But even after the initial consultations 
with the federal government, First Nations leaders were unhappy with the government’s 
response. In the view of Harold Leighton, the Chief Councillor of the Metlakatla Band: 
Our members are extremely frustrated with the complete lack of interest from the 
federal government to negotiate as is required by the law…We have a ‘prima 
facie’ case of aboriginal rights and title to the area of port expansion and the 
federal government just continually refuses to recognize our rights (Prince 
George Citizen, April 15, 2006)        
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The response of the port authority to these accusations was that “[i]t is our 
understanding that a very favourable agreement was presented to First Nations by the 
(last) government (and) it is our understanding that offer was reaffirmed by (the current) 
federal government.” (Prince George Citizen, April 15, 2006).  The offer included a 
number of economic incentives, such as financial support for training and business 
development.  These incentives are important the First Nation communities in question.  
Band officials and members alike realize that the economy of Prince Rupert may be 
entering a period of sustained growth and they just want to make sure that Aboriginal 
peoples also benefit from this development (Kelly, 2006). 
Since 2006, there has been slow but steady progress in dealing First Nations concerns. 
In January of 2008 the federal government appointed a new negotiator to work with the 
Lax Kw’allams, Metlakatia and Gitisaaia. (Ritchie, January 16, 2008). By July of 2008, 
there was a report that progress was being made in the talks on both the outstanding 
issues of the Phase One port development and the concerns (particularly of 
archeological remains on the site) of the Phase Two port development (Ritchie, July 4, 
2008).  
Generally speaking, media reports on this issue tend to focus on the economic benefits 
that the port could bring to the region.  Some of these, such as direct and indirect 
employment opportunities in Prince Rupert, at the inland port in Prince George, support 
for existing resource industries and the development of niche-oriented export industries 
throughout the region have already been mentioned.  But it also appears that 
“[c]ommunities as far east as Sault Ste Marie [Ontario] believe the development of the 
facility in Prince Rupert will help them increase economic activity as the proposed facility 
will serve markets in eastern cities like Chicago and Montreal.” (Prince Rupert Daily 
News, February 25, 2005).  Both the Alberta government and the Northwest Corridor 
Development Corporation (NCDC), an organization representing communities and 
stakeholders in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Yukon Territory and the 
Northwest Territories, have been active supporters of the port development.  Alberta was 
involved in the development of the grain terminal in Prince Rupert in the 1980s and 
representatives of the Alberta government have met with their colleagues from British 
Columbia to discuss issues related to the port (Prince George Citizen, March 18, 2005).  
The western provinces beyond British Columbia clearly view the container port in Prince 
Rupert as a vital gateway to Asia for their resources and manufactured goods.7 
If Outcome One is realized, therefore, the container port could become the engine for 
renewed economic activity throughout northern British Columbia.  As key components of 
the gateway and transportation corridor, larger centers such as Prince Rupert and Prince 
George would obviously feel the most impact.  Both existing and new industries in 
communities along the transportation corridor, however, would also benefit from having 
access to this transportation conduit to global markets.  Existing resource industries 
would have better access to Asian markets, thereby lessening their dependency on the 
American market for resource products.  New industries would emerge and help to 
diversify the northern economy.  This economic expansion would bring employment and 
prosperity to communities that have had to deal with the negative consequences of 
stagnation and the “boom and bust” instability common in resource based economies.    
That said, all of the speculation around the port development has left little room for 
debate or discussion about what will happen if the expectations for the port do no 
materialize. For the next part of the paper we would like to examine two other possible 
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outcomes, and the consequences of the outcomes for the economy and communities of 
northern British Columbia. 
Outcome Two: The Port of Prince Rupert as Transportation, not 
Transformation 
This outcome will essentially mean that the container port will still realize its destiny as a 
transportation gateway, but will have little or no transformational impact on the northern 
British Columbia economy. In this scenario, Prince Rupert is still likely to benefit since 
the port will be operational.  Prince George may also gain from being the site of an 
inland port where containers coming from Prince Rupert are redirected to markets east 
and south. But smaller communities along the Highway 16 corridor will not experience 
diversification and might even be hollowed out by the movement of economic activity to 
these larger centres.   
The ability of smaller communities to take advantage of the opportunities that the port 
offers in terms of access to Asian markets is dependent on a variety of factors.  First, 
manufacturers and other exporters will have to get their product to the inland terminal so 
that they can be containerized and shipped west to the port.  Second, empty containers 
will have to be available and ready to accept these products.  While it is likely that there 
will be no shortage of empty containers making the journey back to Asia, the issue here 
is whether these containers can wait to be packed with products from northern British 
Columbia.  If the overriding goal of shipping companies is to ship the containers back 
and forth between Asia and markets in eastern Canada and the American mid-west as 
quickly and efficiently as possible to serve the interests of large importers, such 
deadlines could work against small producers in northern British Columbia who want to 
ship their products to Asian markets (Ritchie, Feb 26, 2008). The business development 
manager for the port, Andrew Hamilton, argues that,  
There are a lot of key assumptions people have to understand when it 
comes to exporting using containers… The first is, shipping lines own the 
containers, this is key because they are the landlord and they dictate 
where these containers are going. Let’s say there is product up in Fort St. 
John – some wood products – but there is a lot of apprehension by the 
shipping companies to let their containers drift off the supply chain 
because what they want to do is get a higher utilization out of their 
hardware. In addition…the shipping lines make more money on the 
inbound than the outbound journey. We have to be very very quick about 
getting product in to containers, again not letting it drift off into the 
hinterland (Ritchie, Feb 26, 2008). 
The port development has already brought some tangible benefits, largely in the form of 
infrastructure development, to communities along the transportation corridor between 
Prince Rupert and Prince George, as well as east of Prince George into Alberta.  
Canadian National (CN) has invested in the rail infrastructure that links Prince Rupert to 
the rest of the continent. In March of 2008, CN announced that it would invest $430 
million in railway projects in Western Canada, including improvements to the line to 
Prince Rupert (Ritchie, March 19, 2008). But in the event that the opening up of the 
gateway does not provide the expected economic development and diversification 
opportunities in the smaller communities along the corridor, these communities could be 
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“hollowed out” by the emergence of employment opportunities in larger regional centres 
such as Prince Rupert and Prince George.  Such economic movements have been seen 
before in northern British Columbia.  One only has to consider the decline of the small 
mill communities along the upper Fraser River in the 1950s and the ensuing 
concentration of large pulp mills in Prince George (Upper Fraser Historical Geography 
Project), to understand the potential consequences that large scale changes in the 
global economy could bring to small northern communities.              
Such an outcome could reinforce the type of intra-regional squabbling over scarce 
resources and facilities and negative conflict that has often characterized this region 
(Kennedy, 2005, 56).  An economic migration to Prince George, for example, would be 
viewed in outlying communities as a continuation of the broader trend towards 
concentrating resources and services in the self-styled “capital of northern British 
Columbia.”   Indeed, the broader development around the Prince Rupert port has 
already caused intra-regional conflict to arise.  There was intense competition between 
Prince Rupert and nearby Kitimat for the $350 million liquid natural gas terminal. (Prince 
George Citizen, June 29, 2005).  Such competition has fed into and been fuelled by the 
historic rivalry between these two towns.  
Outcome Three: The Port of Prince Rupert as Speculation 
A third potential outcome would be the failure of the port to realize its projected potential, 
either as an engine for regional economic development and diversification and 
development, or as a transportation gateway with some, albeit, limited and concentrated, 
regional benefits.  While it is uncommon for large infrastructure developments to turn into 
“white elephants”, there are a number of precedents in Canada; Mirabel International 
Airport in Montreal and Port Nelson in northern Manitoba are probably the most widely 
known.  Obviously, the external circumstances facing these two transportation 
infrastructures are different from those confronting Prince Rupert.  Nevertheless, their 
decline does beg the question: what will happen if the shipping companies decide not to 
bring their containers to Prince Rupert?        
In order for the port to realize its true potential, there are a number of variables that need 
to be in place. First, it is important to note that the shipping industry is ruled by the 
actions of shipping companies that have no particular connection (beyond a commercial 
relationship) to the port communities where they bring their goods. As Anne Goodchild et 
al point out in their article in this special edition, the decision about which port facility to 
use is driven by the just-in-time delivery structure of modern distribution. Prince Rupert’s 
three day advantage in terms of sailing time from Asia can easily be erased by the 
length of time it takes to get the products out of Prince Rupert and to their final 
destinations (which, for the most part, will be distribution facilities located in the 
American Midwest).  Furthermore, transportation experts tell us that shipping companies 
often choose to vary their ports-of-call depending on where the demand is for their 
products (Goodchild et al, 2008: 12). In this case, the three-day advantage would be 
moot.  
Prince Rupert also suffers from one considerable disadvantage in that it is isolated and 
there is only one single track rail line and roadway in and out of the city. Compounding 
this problem is the fact that the rail and road run parallel to each other, so it is likely that 
both routes will be impacted by natural disasters such as floods and mudslides 
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(Goodchild et al, 2008: 8). If there is a road/rail closure there would be no alternate route 
except air freight.8  While CN Rail, the main railway operator in northern British 
Columbia, has upgraded the track and added a number of new railway sidings, in many 
places the track cannot be twinned because of geological obstacles.  
Despite being an ideal location for a deep-water port and enjoying a number of 
advantages over other west-coast ports, Prince Rupert is entering a highly competitive 
market.  A recent report by BC Stats argues that if the port does not expand at a fast 
enough pace, it will be too small to compete with other North American west coast ports 
(Dan Schrier, 2007).  The fight to be competitive with ports in the United States and 
Mexico may enhance competition between Vancouver and Prince Rupert. The 
development of the Lazaro Cardenas port in Mexico and the expansion of the Panama 
Canal will heighten competition for container traffic on the western seaboard (Wall Street 
Journal, August 8, 2006).  Granted, the full development of these facilities may take 
years, or even decades in the case of the Panama Canal.  Nevertheless, it does call into 
question the notion that “if you build the port in Prince Rupert, the containers will come.”  
It has been suggested that an amalgamation of port authorities in Vancouver with the 
Prince Rupert port might reduce competition but the Prince Rupert Port Authority has 
vigorously resisted this idea (Ritchie, January 23, 2008: 4).   
Another major concern for the port will be the growth, or more accurately the decline, in 
the market for goods manufactured in Asia. The current downturn in the US economy 
has already impacted Walmart, the largest retailer of Asian manufactured goods (Task, 
2008; Kavilanz 2008). Even though some have argued that the middle class would shift 
to Walmart type retailers this does not seem to be the trend. Moreover, inflation in China 
means Chinese goods are not necessarily going to be as cheap as they have been in 
the past (Task, 2008). This could have serious implications for importers and mean a 
decline in the need for container shipping.  Thus, it is possible for the port not to live up 
to expectations. With all major infrastructure projects such as this one, there is a risk that 
“if you build it they may not come.” 
Conclusion 
All of the excitement and “boosterism” around the port development has left little room 
for debate or discussion about what will happen if the expectations for the port do no 
materialize. Proponents of the port naturally seek to emphasize the positive aspects of 
this development and downplay the negative implications of either a success or a failure 
of the project.  Indeed, as academics attempting to provide an objective assessment of 
this development, we are interested in the possible implications of all the different 
outcomes.  As citizens of northern British Columbia, however, we are also interested in 
creating a complete picture of what this development means for the communities in 
which we live and work.   
If all the right conditions are in place (both externally and internally), the Prince Rupert 
container port could very well serve as an engine for regional development.  There is, 
however, some evidence and circumstances that suggest that the container port will not 
achieve this goal, or that it will only partially meet already heightened expectations.  
Northern communities need to prepare themselves for these eventualities.  They need to 
be aware that a successful port and transportation corridor will bring some negative 
consequences, just as the failure of the port will mean a continuation of the status quo.  
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It is also important to note that all of these outcomes mean different things to different 
places. While Outcome One will bring prosperity to the entire region, and Outcome 
Three will bring more of the same, the outcome with the most negative consequences 
for the smaller communities is Outcome Two.  Ironically, smaller communities may prefer 
the status quo to the gradual movement of capital and human resources to larger 
centers.   
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